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Abstract—To fix the more and more serious leakage problem in 
remote access to confidential data, the paper designs and 
implements a secure end-to-end browsing system with mobile 
composition. It enables mobile-authenticated users to browse 
confidential files stored at server side using their personal 
computers securely. The authentication function is in real-time 
such that the system can stop the browsing function once it 
detects that the authenticated mobile is out of the communication 
range of user’s personal computer. 
Data leakage; Secure browsing; Mobile phone; Java applet 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Mobile office infrastructure facilitates people’s daily life by 
enabling them to access to data anytime and anywhere with 
“carry-nothing” philosophy, which, however, accompanies 
with a series of security problems as well, such as data leakage 
during transmission and processing when they connect to the 
servers and Intranet via WiFi, fixed connections in cybercafés, 
hotels and airports. Actually in recent years, we are 
continuously reported events of leaking confidential and 
privacy-related data, during the remote data access and local 
data processing procedures by careless users, especially from 
government [1-3]. Such trouble could be happened even more 
easily if some popular P2P sharing software is installed in the 
terminal devices (personal computer, notebook or PDA), since 
anyone connected to the Internet can search and download the 
data shared by foxy [4,5]. We cannot force people to operate 
their terminal devices as carefully as professional technicians, 
but to keep designing secure end-to-end data access and 
processing infrastructure without sacrificing convenience. 
Consider that a police department runs a content server to 
handle with confidential data collected, including documents, 
pictures and videos. Since people are increasingly relying on 
the web for various operations, the problem is how to 
guarantee an authorized employee to browse such data with his 
notebook installing a generic/normal web browser? In this 
scenario, end-to-end security requires to protect data 
throughout the entire lifecycle, including the storage at server 
side in database, transmission through the Internet, processing 
and sanitization at client side in web application level. Due to 
the popular use of mobile phone as a convenient terminal 
device with constrained resources and small screen, it can help 
to authenticate users and provide some sensitive operations, 
although it has its own security problems [6]. 
In the paper, a mobile-aided secure end-to-end web 
browsing system is proposed for authorized users to access and 
browse confidential data anytime and anywhere. 
A. System Design 
The paper aims to design an end-to-end secure data access 
and browsing system, which keeps the rich browsing capability 
and strong computing resources of personal computers, as well 
as enjoys the mobile office advantage and trustworthy of 
mobile phone. 
The role of the server is to authenticate user’s identity and 
provide authenticated user confidential data requested. In 
particular, the system provider, a government department or a 
company, provides generic/normal user ID and password 
authentication for the registered users to download encrypted 
confidential data to their personal computers through the 
unsecure Internet. Then it depends on any one of the wireless 
communication service providers, such as China Mobile in 
China, to authenticate the registered user’s mobile phone. The 
decryption-related information (the partial key) will send to the 
verified mobile phone for later decryption use. Here, the partial 
key means it cannot be used alone (without the corresponding 
mobile phone) to decrypt data even if it leaks out to the third 
party. The proposed two-level authentication scheme can 
highly enhance server-side authentication function without 
making server-side design and configuration complicated. 
Furthermore, all data are in encrypted form during 
transmission, which avoids unnecessary worry about data 
leakage. 
At client side, the user should prepare a personal computer 
with a personal mobile phone connected to it through blue 
tooth or USB. Decryption key is retrieved by the mobile phone 
and sent to the personal computer to decrypt data. Here, a 
carefully-designed web application is required to protect 
decryption key and decrypted data from leakage or 
modification when browsing them, and sanitize them cleanly 
after usage. 
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B. Related Work 
End-to-end web application security on personal computer 
has been highly focused on since rich web application also 
suffers from various security attacks. For example, the most 
prominent attack on web application, script injection, can be 
easily deployed to web applications providing cross-site 
scripting [7]. Ulfar et al. proposed to enhance client-side 
security enforcement by specifying security policy [8]. There 
are also some similar work to enforce client-side security 
policies [9,10]. However, they all focus on pure security on 
personal computers at application level. Another method to 
secure data privacy is to use digital watermarking technique 
[11]. 
In 2006, Richard et al. proposed to secure mobile 
computing via public terminal [12]. They designed an 
application and thin-client server run on trusted smart phone, 
where security critical operation is processed. Non-security 
critical operation is performed by smart phone interacting with 
public terminal. They further designed a secure web browsing 
system [13] where public terminal can forward encrypted data 
to smart phone to decrypt and display. Such a system requires 
each public terminal installed with a remote device 
communication agent, and it is designed for secure multi-step 
online transaction. 
Zhuang et al. proposed a novel architecture to provide 
trusted computing on public endpoints connecting to a piece of 
chip, called Mobile Trusted Platform Control Module, owned 
by individual user [14]. However, it intends for trusted 
computing but not secure browsing. Besides, from practical 
point of view, people are reluctant to bring another hardware 
(the chip) around for security-related operation. 
C. Paper Organiztion 
The paper first describes the system infrastructure in 
Section II. Then introduce the system implementation in 
Section III. Section IV is the conclusion. 
II. SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE 
Figure 1.  Secure end-to-end browsing system 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the secure browsing system 
mainly includes (1) the content server (CS) with the system 
controller, (2) the user authentication server (US) with the 
partial key generator, (3) the mobile phone (MP) with the key 
retrieval application, (4) the personal computer (PC) with the 
generic browser. The first two components are executed at the 
server side for data storage and user authentication, the last two 
components are run at the client side for key retrieval, 
decryption and display usage. 
NOTATIONS: 
• F: the plaintext of a file 
• e_F: the ciphertext of the file F 
• KAES: an AES key to encrypt/decrypt a file 
• e_ KAES: the ciphertext of the key KAES 
• KOT: a one-time pad key (or a session key) 
• e_ KOT: the ciphertext of the key KOT (or the partial 
key) 
• Enc(data, key) and Dec(e_data, key): a pair of 
encryption and decryption operations to encrypt data 
using key and to decrypt e_data using key. It satisfies 
that data = Dec(Enc(data, key), key). 
A. Content Server with System Controller 
The content server (CS) is prepared by the system provider, 
such as a government department, to provide encrypted 
confidential data which are stored in the content database. In 
particular, the server (CS) generates a unique secret key (KAES) 
for each file (F), encrypts it using AES algorithm [14], i.e.,  
 e_F = Enc(F, KAES), (1) 
which is stored in the content database. All KAES keys are 
considered as permanent and should be safely stored. CS also 
provides normal user ID and password authentication for 
registered users as the first level authentication. 
The system controller is a Java applet which actually starts 
up the whole session from the client point of view when it is 
downloaded and executed automatically at the client side. How 
it controls the user authentication, key distribution, as well as 
file downloading and decryption will be introduced in Section 
III. 
B. User Authentication Server with Partial Key Generator 
The user authentication server (US) is responsible to 
register its content-providing service to a wireless 
telecommunication service provider and obtain a service 
number. Then users should come to register to US with the 
triple (ID, mobile phone number, International mobile 
equipment identity (IMEI)) for the service. The triple is stored 
in the user database. 
The partial key generator will generate one-time pad key 
(KOT) for each session mentioned in II.A. which is controlled 
by the system controller. Once a specific file is requested, its 
corresponding encryption key, KAES, will be further encrypted 
by  
 e_KAES = Enc(KAES, KOT) (2) 
using AES algorithm/XOR. e_KAES will be passed  to CS and 
sent to PC together with e_F. To relate KOT to the session 
initiator (the user), KOT will be further encrypted by  
 e_KOT = Enc(KOT, IMEI) (3) 
using XOR. IMEI is corresponding to the user’s mobile phone 
which can be checked with the user database. We call e_ KOT 
as user’s partial key since without knowing IMEI except the 
mobile phone itself, no one else can retrieve the integrated key 
KOT. 
C. Mobile Phone with Key Retrieval Application 
At client side, the mobile phone (MP) whose IMEI number 
is registered to US should be ready for use. Besides, MP should 
be smart enough to run J2ME applications. Once the session 
starts up, MP is activated to request for partial decryption key 
through a short message. US replies to the request by sending 
e_ KOT to MP.  
The key retrieval application is designed to re-calculate the 
decryption key KAES when MP receives the replied short 
message including e_KOT from US and downloads e_KAES from 
PC by calculating  
 KOT = Dec(e_ KOT, IMEI) (4) 
and  
  KAES = Dec(e_ KAES, KOT). (5) 
KAES is passed through USB/Bluetooth to the system 
controller designed by ourselves to keep KAES from leakage. 
D. Personal Computer with Generic Browser 
To run the whole system, the user should prepare a personal 
computer (PC) with a generic browser installed which supports 
Java applet. It is responsible to display confidential files for 
users. Note that the encrypted files are decrypted by the system 
controller by 
 F = Dec(e_F, KAES). (6) 
SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS. Assume that the connections 
between the user database and US, US and CS, CS and the 
content database, as well as the USB/Bluetooth connection 
between MP and PC, are secure. Here, “secure” means any 
third party cannot eavesdrop or tamper the communication 
between the above two parties. Since the wireless 
telecommunication network between US and MP is unsecure, 
we cannot expect the channel of sending/receiving short 
messages is secure. That is why only a partial key is sent to 
MP. However, we assume that the authentication function 
provided by US to authenticate MP is guaranteed. The Internet 
connection between CS and PC is unsecure, which only 
transmits encrypted data. 
III. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
In the section, a key distribution protocol is described first 
briefly, followed by introducing a MP-PC communication 
interface.  
A. Key Distribution Protocol 
Since all confidential files are stored and transmitted in 
encrypted form, what we should carefully pay attention to is 
the design of the key generation and distribution for encryption 
and decryption operations. There are two kinds of keys we 
design, KAES as file encryption key and KOT as one-time pad 
key. Besides, IMEI is used as the third key to protect KOT. The 
details of how to generate and use such keys have been 
described in Section II as the equations (1)-(6). 
B. MP-PC communication interface 
Since all confidential files are stored and transmitted in 
encrypted form, what we should carefully pay attention to is 
the design of the key generation and distribution for encryption 
and decryption operations. There are two kinds of keys we 
design, KAES as file encryption key and KOT as one-time pad 
key. Besides, IMEI is used as the third key to protect KOT. The 
details of how to generate and use such keys have been 
described in Section II as the equations (1)-(6). 
First of all, the user logs into the system using his ID and 
PWD as usual. A list of filenames will be shown if he passes 
the verification by CS.  
The system controller downloaded, a Java applet, will 
drives MP to send a short message asking for the partial key. 
US replies by generating KOT, searching for the corresponding 
IMEI of MP from the user database and calculating the partial 
key e_KOT, which is sent to MP as a short message. The key 
retrieval application in MP is used to calculate KOT. All the 
above operations are automatically executed. 
Once the user chooses the file he wants to browse, US 
should be aware of the user’s action and calculate e_KAES, 
which is downloaded to PC together with the corresponding 
encrypted file e_F. e_KAES is further delivered to MP to retrieve 
KAES(see equation (5), which is sent back to PC. The system 
controller will decrypt the file F and display it using a generic 
browser. The above actions can be repeated by the user as he 
likes. 
At last when the user closes the window or logout to end 
the session, all sensitive data including KAES and F in PC and 
KOT in MP will be automatically clear! 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The paper designs a mobile-aided end-to-end secure 
browsing system to enable users access to confidential data 
anywhere and anytime securely. It protects confidential data 
from leakage at server side and during the transmission by 
encrypting it. At client side, only mobile-authenticated users 
can get the decryption key to decrypt ciphertext. After that, the 
system will carefully erase the decryption key as well as the 
plaintext. Moreover, the authentication function provided by 
mobile phone is real-time such that once user’s MP is away 
from the communication range with PC, the system will detect 
such event and resist further browsing by the user. As future 
work, it is desired to further discuss the security proof in 
implementing such system to real environment. Besides, the 
security of Java applet should be explored because we need to 
guarantee the security of the system controller which is 
developed using Java applet.  
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